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RESOURCE ALLOCATION, INFORMATION COST
AND THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION*
JAMES E. KRIER* - AND W. DAVID MONTGOMERY...
In a capitalist society the ordinary activities of economic life are
carried out through market transactions. Yet it often occurs, for
reasons suggested below, that the economic activities of one individual impinge on the well-being of another without the intervention of
such transactions. Economists characterize these as cases of "externality"-situations in which markets fail to mediate interactions between
individuals (and situations in which, if proper market coordination did
take place, both interacting individuals could be made better off).
Exploitation of natural resources and depredation of the environment
are by no means the only instances of externality, but they are
common ones of growing current concern, and they are the instances
on which we focus here.
The central core of modem welfare economics is the demonstration
that in those realms of activity in which all interactions are reduced
to transactions in competitive markets, the result is a situation where
no one could be made better off without necessarily making someone
else worse off. But the story of the environment is a catalog of cases in
which the actions of one or a few deprive many of resources which
they often value more highly than those doing the taking. This
happens precisely because no individual holds a well-defined and
exclusive right to use the resources in question. For the fact is that the
institution of private property and the existence of markets are
intimately related. But since it appears at present to be impossible to
establish effective private property rights in certain resources, and
since it seems equally impossible to guarantee that competition shall
prevail or all desirable bargains be struck in the exchange of property
rights, the question arises whether some substitute for the market
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engineers, natural scientists, and social scientists who are dealing with broad, strategic problems
of environmental control; the work is supported in part by the RANN Program of the National
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should be used to mitigate the untoward effects of economic activity.
The common substitute, in practice and in academic literature, is
government intervention.
Government intervention can appear in many forms. The purpose
of this essay is to argue that the same historical and institutional forces
which influence the development of a system of private property in
turn affect the form of government intervention which will appear
when the private property system fails.
In Toward a Theory of Property Rights,' Harold Demsetz outlines a
view of the relationship between externalities and the formation of
private property rights. He envisions an original regime of common
property and suggests that private property rights emerge when the
costs of employing a private property system are more than compensated by gains in allocational efficiency achieved by such a system.
These gains are realized through private negotiations which regulate
the otherwise wasteful interaction between two individuals. When
negotiations occur-when, for example, a polluter and a citizen
bargain about the compensation for the suffering caused by pollution-we say that an "externality" has been "internalized." Externalities abound under systems of common property primarily because of
high transaction costs which prevent negotiations. The institution of
private property economizes on these costs and thus serves to reduce
externalities.
Demsetz does not suggest that private property is the universal
institutional response to growing external costs. Indeed, he recognizes
the unreality of the example we have just used, noting that in cases
like air pollution "it may be too costly to internalize effects through
the market place." 2 In some situations, then, private property is not a
viable response-at least not a viable sole response 3-to the presence
of externalities. Some form of active government intervention-what
Demsetz would probably call "state ownership" 4-is called for. At
least, it is called for if any response at all is justified in the sense of
being worth its costs. Typically, the intervention will be through
legislative and administrative bodies (for the judicial role of defining
1. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Ass'n Papers & Proceedings
347(1967).
2. Id. at 357.
3. A rearrangement of private property rights in instances such as smoke pollution might
achieve net gains even though some form of centralized government intervention-alone or in
conjunction with the rearrangement of rights-might achieve larger net gains. See Calabresi,
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J. Law & Econ. 67,
69 n. 7 (1968).
4. Which he defines as a system where "the state may exclude anyone from the use of a right
as long as the state follows accepted political procedures for determining who may not use
state-owned property." Demsetz, supra note 1, at 354.
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private property rights through common-law rules has been found
insufficient). Typically, it will occur in situations involving large
numbers of people placing conflicting demands on nonexclusive
resources-air, water, scenic beauty, peace and quiet, and so forth.
Demsetz does not develop the application of his views to the form of
"state ownership" or legislative-administrative intervention with
respect to such resources. 5 We believe his analysis can be extended to
help understand the emergence of new forms of such government
intervention. But whereas transaction cost between interacting individuals is central to Demsetz's model, information cost to the
government control body is central to ours.
I

We begin our own exposition with a brief summary of Demsetz's
argument. His central thesis is that "Property rights [in particular,
private property rights] develop to internalize externalities when the
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. '"6 Private property implies the rights of the owner to exclude
others from using, or interfering with the use of, the owner's property.
This is in contrast to communal or common property ownership,
where each member of the community has a right of7 use, but no right
to exclude uses of other members of the community.
While these definitions point out a clear distinction between the
two systems of property rights, they also suggest a similarity. As
Demsetz observes, "Property rights convey the right to benefit or
harm oneself or others. . . . [T]hey specify how persons may be
benefited and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify
the actions taken by persons. The recognition of this leads easily to
the close relationship between property rights and externalities."-8 As
Ronald Coase has demonstrated, externalities exist when, and only
when, the costs of bringing a harmful or beneficial effect to bear on
parties producing and suffering (or enjoying) the effect are greater
than the value of taking the effect into account. 9 The costs of
"internalizing" the effects or bringing them to bear on the interacting
parties arise from transactions-the need for the parties to be
identified and brought together, to negotiate an agreement, and to
enforce or police the resulting contract. Externalities, in short, are a
function of transaction costs; they exist when "the cost of a
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
note

Demsetz, supra note
Demsetz, supra note
Demsetz, supra note
Demsetz, supra note
Coase, The Problem
1, at 348.

1, at 354.
1, at 350.
1, at 354.
1, at 347.
of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). See also Demsetz, supra
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transaction in the rights between the parties . . . [exceeds] the gains
from internalization.' 10
Demsetz builds on the relationship between externalities and
property rights by arguing that a regime of private property emerges
when changes in relative values make it economic to internalize
previously external effects. The point is best understood by brief
reference to an example used by Demsetz. He cites evidence of the
relationship between development of private rights in land among an
Indian tribe and development of the commercial fur trade. At one
time the tribe had in essence a system of communal ownership in land
and animals. Because of this, it was in no individual's interest to
shepherd the animal resource. Relative overhunting can be supposed
to have occurred, for each kill by a member of the tribe would garner
a unit of gain to him, while the unit of loss would be spread among all
the communal owners. In spite of this, hunting before the development of the fur trade was not intense in an absolute sense, simply
because of the abundance of animals and each tribe member's
demand for only a few animals for food and clothing:
The externality was clearly present. Hunting could be practiced
freely and was carried on without assessing its impact on other
hunters. But these external effects were of such small significance
that it did not pay for anyone to take them into account. There
did not exist anything resembling private ownership in land."
Subsequent establishment of the fur trade most likely led to two
developments:
First, the value of furs to the Indians was increased considerably.
Second, and as a result, the scale of hunting activity rose sharply.
Both consequences must have increased considerably the importance of the externalities associated with free hunting. The
property right system began to change, and it changed specifically
in the direction required to take account of the economic effects
2
made important by the fur trade.'
Eventually, a system of private hunting territory-of private property
rights in land-developed among the members of the Indian tribe. The
development appears to support Demsetz's reliance on the importance to property rights formation of "changes in production functions,
market values, and aspirations . . . , changes in economic values,
changes which stem from the development of new technology and the
opening of new markets.....13 We would summarize Demsetz's
10.
11.
12.
13.

Demsetz, supra-note 1, at 348.
Demsetz, supra note 1, at 351-52.
Demsetz, supra note 1,at 352.
Demsetz, supra note 1,at 350.
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observations, but in a way that makes them applicable in a broader
context, by saying that institutions to more efficiently allocate
resources tend to develop in response to relatively increasingvalue of
the resources, whether caused by increasingdemand or otherwise.
In part II of this paper we examine how this proposition might
contribute to understanding the form of government intervention.
Before turning to that task, it is important to confront two questions,
the answers to which also play a part in our argument. First, how is it
that the institution of private property allocates resources more
efficiently than communal ownership? Second, in light of its advantages, why does the institution of private property not always exist in
a society from the outset? We shall take each question in turn.
The economist's concept of efficient or optimal resource allocation
denotes a situation where no reallocation could benefit someone
without necessarily harming someone else; conversely, an efficient
allocation has not been realized where a change in the pattern of
resource use would benefit some without (necessarily) harming others.
Coase has shown that if the costs of negotiation among all persons
affected by conflicting uses of a given resource are zero, the market
will invariably produce an optimal allocation. 14 The reasoning behind
this conclusion has been lucidly summarized by Guido Calabresi:
[T]here is a misallocation when a situation can be improved by
bargains. If . . . bargains are costless . . . transactions will ex
hypothesis occur to the point where bargains' can no longer
improve the situation; to the point, in short, of optimal resource
allocation. We can, therefore, state as an axiom the proposition
that all externalities can be internalized and all misallocations...
can be remedied by the market, except to the extent that
15
transactions cost money ....
Externalities exist when the costs and benefits of resource use are not
fully taken into account. The externalities are not taken into account
because the cost of the accounting procedure (transaction cost)
outweighs the gains to be achieved thereby.
The institution of private property reduces some transaction costs,
thereby making possible more efficient allocations than in the case of
communal ownership. First, private as opposed to communal ownership automatically internalizes some externalities (or automatically
avoids the need for some transactions) by fully concentrating the
benefits and costs of some decisions about resource use on the private
owner. When a member of the Indian tribe kills one animal on his
14. Coase, supra note 9.
15. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 68. We have for the sake of clarity edited out of the quotation
certain qualifications not important to the point we are making.
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land, he enjoys a full unit of benefit but, unlike the result with
communal ownership, suffers a full unit of detriment as well. "This
concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates incentives to
utilize resources more efficiently. "16
Second, private as opposed to communal ownership reduces the
costs of negotiating over remaining externalities, simply because it
reduces the number of contracts necessary to take external effects into
account. A system of common property allows any member of the
community to exploit the communal resource. Accordingly, it is
necessary for all to agree about resource use. But with private
ownership, a decision by one private owner is unlikely in many cases
to produce spillovers affecting all other private owners, but rather
only a few adjacent ones. As a result only a few rather than all owners
need negotiate an agreement that takes the effects into account. The
costs of transacting-the chief impediment to efficient allocation-are
7
accordingly reduced.1
Let us turn to our second question. If the institution of private
property promotes efficient resource allocation by automatically
internalizing some externalities, and by reducing the costs of internalizing others, then why does the institution not always exist in a
society from the outset, rather than emerge (as Demsetz argues)
from a regime of communal ownership? We can suggest several
answers. First, it must be recognized that a system of private property
invites transactions that might be unnecessary under communal
ownership. It is possible to imagine communal ownership of a
resource sufficiently plentiful that each member of the community
could satiate his demands simply by exploiting the resource, and still
some of the resource would remain. But with private ownership of the
same quantity of the resource, costly transactions would be necessary
to satisfy all demands unless the original distribution of private
ownership rights happened to conform to the pattern of individual
demands. Thus, private ownership will, under certain conditions,
entail apparently unnecessary costs.
A system of private property, as compared to communal ownership,
also entails costs of another sort. Even when a resource is so scarce
that, unlike our example above, transactions would serve a useful
purpose, the overhead costs of providing a private property system
may exceed the present value of all future gains from trade net of
transaction cost. As Demsetz has pointed out in other work, 18 there
are costs associated simply with the provision of a private property16. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 356.
17. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 356-57.
18. See Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. Law & Econ. 61, 62 (1966); Demsetz,
The Exchange and Enforcement of PropertyRights, 7 J. Law & Econ. 11, 13-14 (1964).
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private market system. The government must define the property
rights and decide who owns what; it must set up a system to protect
ownership. Thus, when Demsetz says that private property rights
develop "when the gains of internalization become larger than the
cost of internalization,' 19 he must mean not merely that the costs of
transacting are exceeded by the gains thereby realized, but (ironically) that the costs of having a system that economizes on the costs of
transacting are also worthwhile. Otherwise, according to the development of his argument, the private property institution would not
emerge, for it would have existed from the outset!
II
It should be apparent that the concept of "transaction cost" is
central to Demsetz's analysis-indeed, it is central to the entire body
of welfare economics concerned with the formation, exchange, and
enforcement of property rights. Unfortunately, however, the concept
has not been clearly articulated in the literature. Broadly conceived,
it would appear to include the costs of interacting parties identifying
each other, informing each other of a willingness to deal, carrying out
and memorializing negotiations, and enforcing the resulting
agreement.2 0 An attempt has been made to refine the concept of
transaction cost by breaking it down into components: information
cost, contracting cost, and policing cost. 2 1 This tripartition is hardly
crucial, but with some revision it is useful for our purposes.
We will be discussing government intervention in the market place
as a mode of resource allocation. In the broad sense, transaction costs
are attached to this mode just as they are to any other, such as the
market.2 2 But the breadth is misleading; the costs of government
intervention are not usually associated with the costs of market
negotiations between the regulated and the government agency. In
19. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
20. See Coase, supra note 9, at 15. See also, Demsetz, Contracting Cost and Public Policy, in
Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public
Expenditures: The PPB System 167, 169 (Joint Comm. Print 1969) (transaction cost includes
"the costs of search and negotiation in the market place and the cost of insuring that voluntary
agreements are honored"); Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to
the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, id. at 47, 59-60.
21. See Anderson & Crocker, The Economics of Air Pollution:A LiteratureAssessment, in Air
Pollution and the Social Sciences 133, 161 n. 6 (P. Downing ed. 1971). Information cost "means
the cost of obtaining the information about the attributes of the goods in question and the state
of nature necessary to enter into bargaining or market transactions." Contracting cost means
"the cost of finding the market or someone with whom to bargain as well as the costs associated
with the actual transaction. Included would be the costs of forming and maintaining coalitions
with fellow buyers or sellers." Policing costs are "simply the costs of insuring that the terms of a
transaction, once made, are adhered to." Id.
22. See Arrow, supra note 20, at 60.
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one of his papers, for example, Demsetz discusses the costs of
transacting in the market place and then states:
Nonmarket allocation devices will, of course, have costs of their
own. If taxes are used, there is the cost of collecting and enforcing
tax payments. Governmental costs of searching for and administering 23potentially beneficial resource reallocations must be incurred.
As this statement implies, the primary costs of government
intervention2 4 are information and policing costs. 2 5 But here we
expand the meaning of information cost to make it adaptable to
nonmarket (governmental) modes of allocation: information cost is the
cost of gaining and communicating the knowledge necessary to
achieve a more efficient allocation of a given resource-or, in
Demsetz's terms, the "costs of searching for . . . potentially beneficial resource reallocations. . . ." Policing cost is the cost of enforcing
application of the new knowledge-of "administering potentially
beneficial resource reallocations."
We can now state our thesis and give some evidence for it.
THE THESIS
We argue that as a governmentally allocated resource increases in
relative value, government intervention tends to evolve toward
forms that economize on information costs associated with a more
efficient allocation of the resource. Our point can be clarified through
an example.
Goyernmental intervention at both the state and federal levels has
existed for some time with respect to pollution of the air and water
resources. The form of intervention has been distinctly and almost
uniformly that of regulation-the setting of mandatory standards
accompanied by penalties for their violation. Regulation is at the
opposite pole from a private property-private market system; it can
be seen as a process of the state freely granting a right initially owned
by it and then prohibiting its subsequent transfer to any other
individual. But regulation is not the only form government intervention might take in cases of private property-private market failure.
Essentially two other forms exist which occupy a middle ground
23. Demsetz, supra note 20, at 169.
24. We put aside here what we call the secondary costs of government intervention, such as
costs brought about by government-produced misallocations of resources. A market too can be
characterized by these secondary costs, in addition to the primary costs of transactions.
25. This is not to suggest that there is no "contracting" or negotiating within the mode of
government intervention. Bargains occur in the course of passing a law, and in its application-or "negotiated" enforcement. On the former, see G. Tullock, Private Wants, Public Means
69-70 (1970); on the latter, see G. Hagevik, Decision-Making in Air Pollution Control (1970)
(especially Pts. I and III).
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between government fiat and a self-regulating market. One, subsidization, has seen some use in this country. Subsidies implicitly recognize
a property right in polluters, for they consist of direct or indirect
payments to polluters to reduce their emissions. The other form,
pricing, does not imply property rights in polluters, for under a
pricing system payments are exacted from polluters for each unit of
pollution they produce. As a means to control pollution, pricing
has
26
been almost entirely ignored in this country until very recently.
The best-known method of pricing pollution, the emissions or
effluent tax, exacts a predetermined payment from polluters for each
unit of pollution they produce. This pricing method differs from a
pure market in private property rights for the simple reason that the
magnitude of the price of pollution is not determined by the forces of
supply and demand. Some other method of choosing an appropriate
27
price must be found-a point to which we will retum.
We speculate later as to why the regulatory form of intervention
has been predominant. Our purpose here is to make some brief
observations about: (1) the allocative inefficiencies characteristic of
the regulatory method; (2) the high information costs associated with
any attempt to reduce those allocative inefficiencies; (3) the manner
in which a pricing system can economize on information costs while
achieving greater allocative efficiency than the regulatory alternative. 28 We then turn to evidence of increasing value of the air and
water resources, and associate this evidence with trends toward
utilization of pricing systems to control pollution problems.
(1) The regulatory approach to pollution problems characteristically proceeds by establishing an ambient standard of quality and a set
of emission limitations designed to meet that standard. The important
point to note here is that the emission limitations are uniform for each
pollutant source or class of sources. The uniformity is inherently
inefficient: different pollution sources have different marginal costs of
control; some can control more cheaply than others, and there would
be net savings to society if some plants were required to reduce
26. See, e.g.,J. Krier, Environmental Law and Policy 300-301 (1971).
27. Pricing systems which approximate more closely a pure market in private property rights
have also been proposed. In one such system a fixed quantity of licenses, conferring a private
right to pollute, would be issued by the government and sold to polluters (or distributed
arbitrarily among polluters, who then would be able to resell). In such a system the price is
determined by market forces, but the supply is fixed by the government. See J. H. Dales,
Pollution, Property, and Prices 93-100 (1968); Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient
Pollution Control Programs,5 J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972).
28. We do not discuss subsidization in this paper. In practice, if not in principle, subsidies
are as inefficient as regulatory measures. See, e.g., Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal
Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. Rev. 429, 468-70 (1971). Nor do we discuss
policing costs. Our assumption, which we believe to be reasonable, is that policing costs need
not vary significantly among methods of intervention.
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emissions to a greater and others to a lesser degree.2 9 The inefficiency
may, however, be counterbalanced by the savings which result from
the minimal need for information in systems of uniform standards.
(2) One could avoid the allocative inefficiency of uniform standards
by establishing emission limitations varying with the marginal control
costs of each source. But "to do this would require a fantastic amount
of information that in practice would be very difficult and expensive
to get." 30 Much time and effort would be required of the regulator to
gather the data needed to formulate and implement variable standards, if the data could be gotten at all! There is little reason -to
suppose that factory managers have much explicit information about
marginal control costs. Moreover, there would be a tremendous
incentive to overstate those costs, for the higher the costs, the less
stringent the required degree of control. In short, the information
costs associated with variable standards would be enormous. Gains in
allocative efficiency would be eaten up by the costs incurred in
achieving them. The information costs are an expense of administering the program, and the regulatory method thus reflects a tension
between allocative and administrative efficiency.
(3) Pricing systems can achieve varying emission outputs while
avoiding the high information costs associated with varying emission
regulations. A properly set, uniform emission fee would achieve the
collectively established ambient standards at least cost to society. The
reasons for this are relatively simple. As we said above, different
polluters have different marginal costs of control. Assuming (more
than reasonably, we believe) that each polluter wishes to minimize its
costs, each will blend abatement and emission fee expenses in the way
it finds cheapest for it. A fee that results in the desired ambient
quality has achieved that level of quality at least cost to society.3 1
29. See Dales, supra note 27, at 85.
30. Dales, supra note 27, at 85. Other difficulties might also arise. For example, would it be
equitable to require the most efficient pollution controller to spend the most on abatement
measures?
31. See Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1972);
Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, The Pub. Interest, Spring (1970) at 69. As
Baumol puts it, with an emission fee or some other variant of a pricing system, "it can be shown
that, unlike any system of direct controls [i.e., regulation], it promises, at least in principle, to
achieve decreases in pollution or other types of damage to the environment at minimum cost to
society." Baumol, supra, at 319. In a footnote to this observation Baumol states: "This
proposition has been suggested elsewhere . . . and will be fairly obvious to anyone familiar
with the analysis of the allocative effects of price changes and their efficiency properties.
Specifically, suppose it is desired to reduce the pollution content of a river by k percent.
Obviously a k percent reduction in the number of gallons emitted by each of the plants
discharging wastes into the river will generally not be the desired solution. The theorem in
question then asserts the following:
Given the production of any desired vector of final outputs by the plants along the
river, a tax per gallon of effluent sufficient to reduce the overall pollution content
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While there are substantial information costs associated with
choosing and applying the proper emissions tax, 32 they are less than
the costs of devising and employing a system of varying emission
regulations equal to the pricing program in allocative efficiency. Even
if the costs of obtaining information from polluters are the same under
both approaches, total information cost of the pricing system will be
lower. Information must under either flow in two directions, not only
from polluter to government but subsequently from government to
polluter as well. But with varying regulations, a different piece of
information must be determined and communicated to each polluter.
With a uniform (and efficient) emissions tax, on the other hand, one
piece of information does for all.
SOME EVIDENCE

We have suggested that as demand for a governmentally allocated
resource increases-that's to say, as the resource becomes more
scarce-government intervention tends to evolve toward forms that
economize on information costs associated with a more efficient
allocation of the resource-specifically in our case, to pricing systems.
Our argument thus far is much like Demsetz's. As a resource becomes
more scarce, it usually becomes more valuable, and efficient allocation of the resource becomes more worthwhile. It is only worthwhile,
however, if it can be achieved without corresponding increases in the
costs of information. And we have tried to show that a pricing system
economizes on information costs while at the same time "[flt
automatically achieves an efficient allocation of the required reduction in emissions among the offending firms. . .. ."33
of the river to the desired level will automatically achieve this decrease at
minimum total cost to all plantscombined.
The proof of the theorem is a straightforward exercise in constrained maximization. . . . It
works, of course, because the lower the marginal cost of reduction in pollution outflows of a
particular plant, the larger the reductions it will pay it to undertake to avoid the corresponding
tax payment.
"What is surprising about the proposition, if anything, is that, unlike many results in welfare
analysis, it does not require the firms along the river, or any other firms, to be perfect
competitors, nor does it have to assume that they maximize profits rather than share of market
or growth or some other target variable. All it requires is that the firms wish to produce
whatever output they select at minimum cost to themselves." Id. at 319, n. 15.
32. See, e.g., Davis & Kamien, Externalities, Information and Alternative Collective Action, in
Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public
Expenditures: The PPB System 67, 83 (Joint Comm. Print 1969) ("immense informational
requirements necessary for the implenentation of . . . [an emissions tax] scheme. A little
reflection will make it apparent that the government agency imposing a tax . . .will need to
know the production technologies of all the entities involved.").
33. Baumol, supra note 31, at 308. Notice we say only that a pricing system efficiently
allocates the resource within the ambient standard among the pollution sources, not that it
produces an ambient standard that is itself efficient or optimal. At present, no operational
technique exists to determine optimal allocations of nonexclusive resources like the waste
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We find evidence for our thesis in the increasing demands placed
upon such natural resources as air and water and in the almost
revolutionary recent interest in "the pricing of pollution" in the
United States.
On the first point, one can encounter quibbles. But even those who
imply that in absolute terms overall environmental quality might be
improving concede that the supply of this luxury good "has fallen far
short of the rising effective demand . . . , and the supply of certain
critical goods, such as pure air and water, has virtually vanished." 34 It
is true that in some areas recent improvements in air and water
quality have been realized, thanks largely to the feverish interest in
the environment that began in the mid-sixties. But the very feature
that many believe spawned that interest-rapid growth in population
and consumption-promises a relative and probably too an absolute
deterioration of the quality of air and water resources by the
mid-1980s at latest. 35 For example, recent work suggests that air
quality in the Los Angeles Basin will gradually improve until about
that time, and then-because of increases in population and consumption (particularly of automobile driving)-once again begin to
deteriorate. And this with one-hundred percent application of the
best that control technology presently has to offer. 36
Increasing concern about proper use of air, water and other natural
resources has been accompanied by increasing interest in emission
fees and other pricing mechanisms; the correlation is underscored by
the fact that writers commenting on the first phenomenon also note
the second in the same breath. 37 Some notion of just how revolutionary the change in attitude has been can be gathered from events of
the last few years. A 1969 news article in the New York Times told of
"objections" to Senator Proxmire's proposal for an effluent tax to
control water pollution. The story listed conservationists' complaints
about the measure and implied that the tax would be nothing more
disposal capacities of air and water. See Baumol, supra note 31, at 316, 318-20. With pricing, as
with regulation, the ambient standard is set legislatively-Baumol says "More or less
arbitrarily," Baumol, supra note 31, at 307, we say hopefully with a legislative eye open to the
costs of achieving a certain standard and the benefits realized thereby.
34. See, e.g., Jacoby, The Environmental Crisis, The Center Magazine, Nov.-Dec. 1970, at
37-38.
35. See, e.g., id. at 39 (exponential decline in amenities); Kneese & d'Arge, Pervasive External
Costs and the Response of Society, in Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., The
Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System 87, 102 (Joint Comm. Print
1969) (rapid nonlinear increase in external costs with economic and population growth); Dale,
The Economics of Pollution, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1970, §6, pt. I (Magazine), at 27, 28, 40-41
(pollution and the law of compound interest).
36. Based on work at the Environmental Quality Laboratory, California Institute of
Technology. See, L. Lees. etal., Smog: A Report to the People, 122-26, 144 (1972).
37. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 35, at 44, 47 (emission fees being "increasingly explored").
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than a license to pollute. 38 Today the scene is radically different:
Federal and state legislation-some enacted, some proposed-provides
for, or at least requires consideration of, emission taxes as a control
measure; 39 and "several politically important conservation groups,
which previously had opposed the charges approach, have stepped
solidly behind the effort to levy pollution charges or taxes." 40 Indeed,
some conservationists have joined together to form the Coalition to
Tax Pollution.4 1 We do not mean to suggest that the new interest in
pricing systems reflects an entirely conscious effort to exploit their
efficiencies (although to the extent that economists are involved, some
conscious effort surely exists), any more than Demsetz argues that the
evolution of private property represents a conscious endeavor to
adjust to new resource problems. Demsetz views the pattern of
adjustment as made up of "hit-and-miss" experiments, and simply
suggests that "in a society that weights the achievement of efficiency
heavily," those experiments that prove to have relative advantages in
these terms will survive. 42 We say little beyond this. Deterioration of
natural resources has produced dissatisfaction with the present modes
of government intervention, 43 and the current attention being given
to pricing is likely little more than a "hit-and-miss" (but fortunate)
experiment. A test of our thesis, and perhaps of Demsetz's, will be the
survival of pricing systems. A further test will be whether other
techniques of pricing, which appear to bring with them even lower
44
information costs than emissions taxes, will come to be in vogue.
38. Hill, Objections to a Tax on Pollution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1969, at 38.
39. At the state level, Vermont has enacted a program to charge waste dischargers an
effluent fee until they come into compliance with standards set by the state's water quality
legislation. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §912a (1970). Maine, Wisconsin, and Illinois, among other
states, are considering "more nearly pure" effluent charge strategies for water quality control.
See Resources for the Future, Resources, 9, 10, Jan. 1972 [hereinafter cited as Resources].
On the federal level, President Nixon and the Council on Environmental Quality have
supported emission charges, and legislation calling for effluent charges to control water quality
has been introduced. Id. Regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. §§1857-58(a) (1970), include emission taxes among the measures which states may
employ as part of an air quality control strategy. See, e.g., E.P.A. Reg.§§ 420.1(n)(2), 420.6(a)(2),
36 Fed. Reg. 15487-88 (1971). See also 36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (1971).
40. Resources, supra note 39, at 10.
41. Resources, supra note 39, at 10. The Resources article contains a good summary of the
recent conservationist interest in pricing systems.
42. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350.
43. E.g., Resources, supra note 39, at 10. ("The change in position results mostly from their
[conservationists'] conclusion that the conventional enforcement-subsidy strategy is not
working.")
44. For example, a system in which marketable rights to pollute are issued in fixed quantity
by the government, see Montgomery, note 27 supra, can achieve the same outcome as the
emissions tax but with even lower information costs, since in such a system it is unnecessary that
the government estimate how emissions will change when a tax is levied. That is to say, it is
easier to determine the number of rights to achieve a certain level of quality than it is to
determine the price which will do so, See supra note 27.
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III

Earlier in this paper we outlined Demsetz's thesis and discussed
why it is that the institution of private property, with its apparent
advantages, might not always exist in a society from the outset. We
propose to close by examining our own thesis in the same way. If
pricing systems can achieve efficient allocations while at the same
time economizing on the costs of information relative to other equally
efficient systems, why have they not been the primary means of
legislative intervention in the cases we have been discussing?
By considering the information costs associated with a pricing
system, our thesis can be supported in the same overhead-cost terms
by which we supported Demsetz's. The government initially intervened to allocate the resource because of market breakdowns. While
the resource was sufficiently valuable to justify intervention, its value
was small enough that the gains from an efficient allocation by the
government were not worth the information costs associated with
achieving them. So uniform regulations, which, thanks to their
crudeness, entail little information cost, have been used. Over time,
however, increasing value of the resource makes any efficiency gains
more worthwhile, while associated information costs remain more or
less fixed. When value has increased sufficiently, one would (according
to our argument) expect to see a shift to pricing systems to realize
those efficiency gains, because the higher information costs associated
with such systems are now worthwhile and also lower than the
information costs of a regulatory system equal in allocative efficiency.
It thus far appears that our analysis, taken together with Demsetz's,
would lead to a Panglossian conclusion. Demsetz suggests that within
the realm of the private market, institutions will naturally develop
such that private bargains will work to allocate resources as efficiently
as possible, since all bargains in which gains from trade exceed the
costs of realizing them will take place. Presumably, however,
Demsetz would recognize that in at least some cases government
intervention might nevertheless be able to improve upon the best
possible market allocations. But now we have suggested that more
efficient institutions of government intervention will tend to evolve
whenever the costs of setting up and employing the new institutions
are less than the gains thereby realized. Surely this is the best of all
possible worlds, for no market or governmental institution which does
not develop could possibly improve upon those which do. In short,
whatever happens is fine, at least in terms of efficiency.
This conclusion, however, can be avoided, for though Demsetz's
analysis suggests an important factor in the development of institu-
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tions, other influences are at work as well. Let us give some examples
in the case of pricing systems.
Recall that the initial legislative attacks on pollution in the United
States came as the result of dramatic pollution episodes. These
produced direct and immediate government reaction of the most
straightforward nature. "Wrongdoers" were identified and criminal
penalties established-all to placate public concern. The response
typified what Willard Hurst has called our "bastard pragmatism," or
hostility to theory:
This was dramatic action, which conveyed the appearance of
decisive resolution of problems. These features made it a type of
legal action which too well fitted our native impatience and the
strain of bastard pragmatism which preferred the more obvious,
close-to-hand, shortly-accomplished action as compared with
multi-factored, long-term planning and organization. 45
Another facet of this pragmatism was a "preoccupation with operating technique (the 'practical') and our relative impatience with
understanding (the 'theoretical') ..
"46 Pricing systems are largely
theoretical-nonmechanical innovations as opposed to the mechanical-technological innovations so tied up with the regulatory approach
to pollution over the past fifty years. The diffusion of nonmechanical
innovations in advanced societies such as our own has typically been
47
relatively slow.
Narrow interests can also retard the development of socially
efficient institutions, or spur the development of inefficient ones.
While pricing promises to achieve a given ambient level at least cost
to society, it is not clear that it would do so at least cost to the
regulated class. Each pollution source will act to minimize its total
costs under the constraint of the tax, but this sum may often be larger
than the total expenditure by a source under an existing system of
uniform regulations. 48 The fact that a pricing system yields a net
45. J. Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History 293 (1960).
46. Id. at 31.
47. See, e.g., E. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 129 (1966). But see id. at 133.
48. Since this is a somewhat contentious point, the mathematically minded reader should
consider the following example. Assume two polluters with the following equations stating the
cost of emitting pollution at various rates ei:

C, =50-10 e, +- e
C 2 =50-

10e

2

+e

2

Assume that the ambient quality standard is achieved whenever el + e 2 = 9, and that initially
there is a uniform regulation such that el =e 2 =4.5. Under this regulation costs to firm 1 are 15.1
and costs for firm 2 are 25.2. Total cost is 40.3. Now suppose that a uniform emissions tax of 4
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savings for society does not mean these savings will be distributed to
the pollution sources. To the extent that pollution sources see pricing
systems as disadvantageous, one would expect industry opposition to
them-and with some success, since the legislative battle would be
between a relatively concentrated group of well-organized polluters
and a diffused public.
Finally, we must point out the weakness in our implicit assumption
that government works to maximize efficiency, even if free of
pressures from concentrated interest groups. Unlike a private
entrepreneur, 49 government officials are by no means always in a
position to capture the benefits of efficiency gains that might be
achieved by institutional reform; accordingly, incentives for reform
will not always be strong. But the point should not be carried too far.
In principle, it is possible to distribute those benefits in such a manner
that no one is made worse off, and many are made better off, than
under the previous regime. In the long run, one could expect that in
any system where government is responsive to the wishes of a
majority of its constituents, a change which benefits that majority
without harming any significant group would be adopted.
Considerations like these suggest that institutional form will
respond to other than simply the forces of efficiency, and worthwhile
changes will on occasion not occur at all; sometimes they will be
untimely; at other times they will be in answer to broad demands for
fairness and justice rather than to concerns with efficiency. But this is
not to say that forces of efficiency will not also be felt. And the fact is
that we can observe "changes in technology and relative prices" and
per unit of emission is imposed. Each firm will equate its marginal control cost to the tax. Since
we have
MC, = -10 + e,
and

MC2 =

10+2 2c2 ,

it follows that in response to the emissions tax, el = 6 and e 2 =3 will be chosen, producing the
desired air quality. But what is the cost? Total control cost is 8 + 29 = 37, which is less than total
control cost under uniform regulation and therefore better from society's point of view. But
each firm is now paying a tax on the pollution which remains, which amounts to 4 x 6 + 4 x 3 or
36, giving a total cost to polluters of 73. The emissions tax involves a transfer from polluters to
society as a whole which, unless refunded to polluters in some way, can leave them worse off
than under inefficient regulation. See Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 Am.
Econ. Rev. 90 (1967); Mishan, On the Theory of Optimwn Externality: Comment, 58 Am. Econ.
Rev. 523 (1968).
49. See, e.g., Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937), in Readings in Price
Theory 331 (G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds. 1964).
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"the emergence of new . . . state-owned property rights . . .in
50
response."

50. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. See generally, L. Davis & D. North, Institutional Change
and American Economic Growth (1971).

